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Abstract
In this paper, we contribute to the debate on whether exchange rate volatility is detrimental
or not for welfare by characterizing optimal monetary policies in a two-country OLG model where
markets are incomplete. The equilibrium nominal exchange rate is volatile as a result of shocks
against which agents are not able to insure. In a non-cooperative environment, central banks have
an incentive to devaluate the domestic currency by giving monetary transfers to domestic agents.
However, such policies result in higher exchange rate volatility. We show that cooperation reduces
exchange rate volatility as: (1) the negative spillover effects due to the expansionary monetary policies
are internalized; (2) cooperative policies smooth the effects of shocks to fundamentals on the exchange
rate. For standard parameter values, the gains from cooperation are not negligible. However, for
cooperation to be Pareto improving countries should be weighted differently in the social welfare
function. This could explain the lack of cooperation across countries, instead of the negligible gains
as previously argued.
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1 Introduction
The question of whether exchange rate volatility is detrimental or not from a welfare
point of view is long-standing in economics. Although many countries have officially
adopted a flexible exchange rate regime since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system,
many central banks intervene in foreign exchange markets as they seem to have a sense
of unease about letting exchange rates be solely determined by market fundamentals. In
fact, only 15.2% of the IMF members let their currency freely float and the number of
countries with a de facto free floating exchange rate arrangement is decreasing1. There
is also an increasing perception that we are living in an era of “currency wars”, where
countries use monetary policy to manipulate the exchange rate at their advantage. It is
often thought that one of the side effects of these “uncoordinated actions” can be too
much exchange rate volatility2. In this context, calls for international cooperation are
becoming increasingly common3.
The aim of this paper is to revisit the question of whether exchange rate volatility
should be a concern for monetary policy in a model where markets are incomplete. The
main idea behind the paper can be briefly described as follows. When markets are in-
complete, it is well known that the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal (e.g.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986). If the nominal exchange rate is volatile as a con-
sequence of shocks to fundamentals of the economy, against which agents are not able
to insure, then it follows that the exchange rate fluctuations which arise in the economy
are inefficient. In this context, central banks’ attempts to influence the nominal exchange
rate might have a rationale. We then ask the following questions. Firstly, what is the
impact of monetary policy on the nominal exchange rate when central banks set their
policies optimally but act in a non-cooperative environment? Secondly, does cooperation
among central banks imply that exchange rate volatility is reduced as a result or not?
Finally, what are the welfare consequences of cooperation and are there sizable gains?
To answer these questions, we consider a tractable two-country stochastic OLG model.
Assuming that the utility function is logarithmic in consumption, we are able to find
closed-form solutions for the competitive equilibrium and for optimal policy rules. With
log utility, it is well known markets are effectively complete with productivity shocks alone
1See IMF (2014).
2See e.g. Portes (2012).
3See Blanchard (2016) and Frankel (2016) for recent discussions.
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(Cole and Obstfeld, 1991). In our framework, market incompleteness will then result from
agents’ inability to insure against demand shocks. In particular, agents gain utility from
the domestic and the foreign good (as well as leisure) but the weights assigned to the two
goods in the utility function depend on the state of nature in which the agent is born4.
In the first period, agents make a decision about how much labour to supply to domestic
firms, which produce a country-specific good, while in the second period they consume.
The saving instruments are two currencies, which serve as stores of value as it is standard
in overlapping-generations models with money. Hence, agents make a portfolio decision
between the domestic and the foreign currency. After the shock takes place in the following
period, the domestic (foreign) currency is then used to buy the domestic (foreign) good.
Central banks can print money supply, hence their monetary policy instrument is the rate
of money growth5. For the sake of realism, the (nominal) monetary transfers can only be
given to domestic agents. In equilibrium, central banks are able to affect the dynamics
of the nominal exchange rate by changing the monetary transfers. Our object of analysis
will be the stationary equilibrium of the economy, which is defined as a distribution across
states of nature of the consumption allocation6.
After proving that a stationary equilibrium exists and is unique, we set up a planner’s
problem where the objective is to maximize a weighted sum of the utility of all agents
in the world economy subject to the feasibility constraints and the production functions.
Agents are distinguished not only by their country, but also by the state of nature in which
they are born. The notion of optimality that we use is Conditional Pareto Optimality
(CPO), which requires that, conditional on being born in a particular state of nature,
there is no other allocation which makes the agents better off. We then prove that the
competitive equilibrium is not CPO. This means that markets are sequentially incomplete
i.e. agents are not able to insure against the risk they face when old7. In equilibrium,
the exchange rate is volatile as a consequence of the uncertainty on the fundamentals of
the economy, i.e. agents’ preferences for the domestic and the foreign good. Since the
4Pavlova and Rigobon (2008, 2010) also focus on shocks to the degree of home bias to study the dynamics of asset prices
and portfolios in open economy. Similarly to us, they assume log utility to get analytical solutions. Studies showing that
demand shocks are an important source of international spillovers include Stockman and Tesar (1995), Pavlova and Rigobon
(2007), Wen (2007) and Corsetti et al. (2014).
5Other papers which study optimal policy using the same instrument are e.g. Devereux and Engel. (2003) and Liu and
Shi (2010).
6Therefore, consumption depends on the state of nature but not on the history of the economy or the particular date.
7The welfare criterion that we use is weaker than ex-ante optimality, which also requires that agents are able to insure
against the risk they face when young. See Muench (1977) and Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999) for a discussion.
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equilibrium is suboptimal, then this implies that exchange rate fluctuations as driven by
the fundamentals are inefficient.
Secondly, we show that monetary transfers are not neutral as they affect the equilibrium
allocation. As the competitive equilibrium is not CPO, this means that there is scope
for monetary policy to implement a better allocation. The main trade-off which will be
at the heart of optimal policy both in the non-cooperative and in the cooperative case
can be described as follows. On the one hand, an increase in the money supply means a
higher wealth for the domestic agents, which incentivize them to work less and to enjoy
more leisure. On the other hand, lower working hours mean a lower output, which implies
lower consumption not only for domestic agents but also for foreign ones.
Under non-cooperation, each central bank chooses the domestic monetary transfers
which maximize a weighted sum of the utility of the domestic agents taking as given the
policy of the other central bank. Under the optimal policy, the incentive is to devaluate
the domestic currency by setting a positive monetary transfer in all states of nature.
In doing so, each central bank imposes a negative spillover to the other country whose
consumption of the foreign good is reduced. This attempt is self-defeating as the countries
end up in a suboptimal (Nash) equilibrium.
Under cooperation, the welfare function is the same one that we adopt for the plan-
ner’s problem. The main difference is that the cooperating central banks cannot directly
choose the consumption allocation and the labor supply but need to operate through their
monetary policy instruments. We show that the two negative spillovers occurring under
non-cooperation are internalized and output in both countries is higher. We also show
that the two central banks, when cooperating, are able to implement a first-best alloca-
tion through their monetary policy instruments. However, this requires that the country
which faces the highest global demand for the domestic good is given a higher weight in
the social welfare function. The reason is that the agents born in such country need to
put a higher labor effort, which decreases their utility. To compensate for that, those
agents must be assigned a higher weight. This paper then suggests a novel reason behind
the fact that countries find international monetary cooperation difficult8. Since the two
countries must be treated differently if a first-best allocation is to be implemented, then
it is likely that the country weighted less would not agree to cooperate.
Next, we compare the volatility of the nominal exchange rate under three different
8See Ostry and Ghosh (2016) for other reasons behind the lack of international cooperation.
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scenarios: (1) a situation where central banks are inactive and the exchange rate only
moves with the demand shocks; (2) non-cooperation; (3) cooperation. We show that the
volatility can be clearly ranked: it is the highest under non-cooperation, while it is the
lowest under cooperation. In a non-cooperative environment, it is interesting to note
that central banks make exchange rate volatility even worse as compared to a scenario
where they are inactive. This result can be explained as follows. In the state of nature
where there is a high demand for the domestic good, the domestic currency appreciates
in equilibrium as all agents in the world economy require more domestic currency. Under
non-cooperation, both central banks increase money supply. However, the domestic cen-
tral bank pursues a relatively less expansionary policy (compared to the other country)
to incentivize labour effort knowing that domestic agents have a high demand for the do-
mestic good. As a result, the currency appreciates even further. Cooperation is then able
to achieve two things. Firstly, it eliminates the excess exchange rate volatility created
under non-cooperation. Secondly, it curbs the excess volatility due to the incomplete-
ness of the markets. Cooperation implies that the two central banks agree to carry out
a relatively more expansionary monetary policy in the country whose currency tends to
appreciates because of a relatively high demand for the domestic good (hence, for the do-
mestic currency). In other words, the two central banks would implement policies which
“lean against the wind”. Another interesting finding is that while cooperation takes care
of the excess volatility, it does not implement a fixed exchange rate or a monetary union.
This means that some degree of exchange rate volatility can be harmless.
We then look at the welfare consequences of cooperation. In particular, we ask whether
moving from the Nash equilibrium to the CPO allocation through cooperation involves
welfare improvements for all agents in the world economy. This is not obvious since while
cooperation always involves an increase in output, it also implies lower leisure. We prove
that all agents would gain in moving from a non-cooperative environment to the CPO
allocation for an open set of parameters. However, if countries are sufficiently heteroge-
neous, we demonstrate that the first-best allocation might not be Pareto improving. In
the transition from the Nash equilibrium to the Pareto frontier, one of the two countries
could be worse off. However, there exist other (second-best) allocations which can be
reached through cooperation and are Pareto improving. This still requires that countries
are weighted differently in the social welfare function. In these cases, we show that a
utilitarian welfare function which treats agents identically does not deliver an allocation
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that improves welfare for all agents, making international monetary cooperation basically
impossible.
Finally, we investigate whether cooperation can bring relevant welfare gains. For our
benchmark parametrization, the welfare gains are equal to 0.6% in terms of equivalent
consumption. Although this number is not particularly large, it is far from negligible.
This is especially considering that, in a New Keynesian setting, the gains from cooper-
ation are exactly zero when the utility function is logarithmic as in this paper9. Hence,
our framework suggests that international monetary cooperation among central banks is
worthwhile. The excess exchange rate volatility due to the incompleteness of the markets
and central banks’ incentives in a non-cooperative environment is costly, hence it is in
central banks’ best interest to cooperate in order to reduce it.
Related literature - This paper speaks to several strands of literature. Firstly, it relates
to other general equilibrium models of nominal exchange rate (in)determinacy with flexible
prices. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper showing that fundamentals-
related exchange rate fluctuations are inefficient in a flexible price environment. For
instance, exchange rate movements in Lucas (1982) are efficient since markets are complete
and the competitive equilibrium of the economy is Pareto optimal. In an OLG model
where two currencies can be used to buy a single consumption good, Manuelli and Peck
(1990) demonstrated that, for any equilibrium allocation, one can construct many paths
of the nominal exchange rate. Hence, the exchange rate volatility arising in their model
is irrelevant from a welfare point of view. In two-period models with incomplete markets
where assets (in zero net supply) are nominal and denominated in multiple currencies,
there is real indeterminacy of the equilibrium allocation so that for each equilibrium we
have a different value of the nominal exchange rate (Polemarchakis, 1988). Introducing
outside money into the model, Pietra and Salto (2011) have shown that there is no way to
Pareto rank the different equilibria and to make a clear-cut statement on exchange rate
volatility.
Secondly, this paper is connected to the literature on the gains from cooperation.
Our paper has in common with Cooley and Quadrini (2003), Celentani, Conde-Ruiz and
Desmet (2006) and Liu and Shi (2010) the investigation of the gains from cooperation
in flexible price models with perfect competition. Differently from this paper, countries
do not attempt to manipulate the nominal exchange rate per se and the welfare issues
9See e.g. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc, 2010.
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surrounding the volatility of the exchange rate are not explored10. This issue has been
extensively studied in economies with sticky prices and imperfect competition. Some key
contributions include Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2006),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) just to name a few. The gains from cooperation in New
Keynesian models are typically negligible, and are exactly zero when the utility function
is logarithmic. This led Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) to argue that international spillovers
from monetary policy are a second-order problem as compared to internal objectives such
as price and output stabilization11.
This paper is also related to recent papers which adopt an OLG framework to analyse
“currency wars” at the zero lower bound (Eggertsson et al., 2016; Caballero, Fahri and
Gourinchas, 2016). As in this paper, issuances of public debt and helicopter drops are
identical policies when the nominal interest rate is zero since the two assets are perfect
substitutes. In our model, such policies have a “beggar-thy-neighbour” effect: an in-
crease in domestic money supply decreases foreign consumption by negatively affecting
the labour supply of the domestic agent through a wealth effect. On the other hand, in
these papers they generate a positive spillover by increasing output in all countries due
to the nominal rigidities12.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the model and compute the
stationary equilibrium. In section 3, we analyse the planner’s problem to identify the set
of conditionally Pareto optimal allocations. In section 4, we look at optimal policy under
non-cooperation and cooperation. In section 5, we compare the volatility of the nominal
exchange rate under different policy scenarios. In section 6, we investigate the welfare
consequences of cooperation. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
10In Cooley and Quadrini (2003) and Celentani et al. (2006), countries have an incentive to manipulate the terms of
trade. In Liu and Shi (2010)’ s model with search frictions, countries attempt to exploit deviations from the law of one
price.
11This point has not been challenged by subsequent literature. See e.g. the literature review of Corsetti et al. (2010).
However, Rabitsch (2012) demonstrated in a model with imperfect risk sharing that the gains are of an order of magnitude
larger than under complete markets. Differently from her paper, our welfare gains do not rely on the existence of nominal
rigidities and can be thought of as long-run gains from cooperation.
12‘In Eggertsson et al. (2016) and Caballero et al. (2016), “currency wars” arise instead due to exchange rate policies:
since in their framework the nominal exchange rate is indeterminate a` la Kareken and Wallace (1981), it can be manipulated.
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2 The model
Time is discrete. At each date, a state of nature s realizes. The number of states S is
finite. st denotes an event and st+1|st is an immediate successor.
There are two countries. In each period, an agent with a two-period lifetime is born
in each country. For simplicity, we assume that agents work in the first period and
consume in the second. Hence, we abstract from saving decisions. Competitive firms
produce a country-specific good, but agents gain utility from the consumption of both
goods produced in the world economy as in Lucas (1982). We will use the superscript `
to indicate the good or currency of country `, while the subscript h will refer to agents.
Two currencies are available in the world economy. M `(st) are the units of currency
` in event st. We set currency 1 as our nume´raire. e(st) is the nominal exchange rate
or the relative price of currency 2 with respect to currency 1. If e(st) rises, we say
that the currency of country 2 appreciates with respect to currency 1. Central banks
distribute lump-sum (nominal) monetary transfers. T `h(s
t) denotes the transfers that the
old agent born in country h receives from the government of country ` in event st. For the
sake of realism, agents only receive transfers from the domestic government: T `h(s
t) = 0
for h 6= `. We will study the stationary equilibrium of the model, i.e. an equilibrium
allocation where consumption varies across states of nature but does not depend on the
history of the economy.
2.1 Firms
Firms produce a country-specific good according to the production function: y`(st) =
Z`(s)L`(st). Labour productivity Z`(s) depends on the state realized and follows a first-
order Markov chain. f(s′|s) is the probability that s′ realizes conditional on state s
(transition probability).
Firms’ maximisation problem is then the following:
max
L`(st)
p`(st)y`(st)− ω`(st)L`(st)
subject to:
y`(st) = Z`(s)L`(st)
where ω`(st) is the nominal wage and p`(st) is the price of good ` in the event st, which are
both denominated in units of the domestic currency `. As there is perfect competition,
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workers are paid their marginal product:
ω˜`(st) ≡ ω
`(st)
p`(st)
= Z`(s)
where ω˜`(st) is the real wage.
We will assume that labour markets are closed, so that firms can only hire domestic
workers.
2.2 Central banks
Money supply evolves as follows:
M `(st+1|st) = M `(st) + T `(st+1|st)
In each period, each central bank commits to giving a monetary transfer T `(st+1|st) to the
generation born in the current period (and in the domestic economy) when they become
old. We assume that the transfer is proportional to the total stock of money supply and
such proportion depends on the current state of nature:
T `(st+1|st) = µ`(s)M `(st)
where µ`(s) is the monetary policy instrument. Therefore, the law of motion of money
supply is:
M `(st+1|st) = (1 + µ`(s))M `(st) 1 > µ`(s) > −1 (1)
The monetary transfers can vary across states of nature. However, the transfer is
perfectly anticipated from the perspective of the agent that receives it when old since it
depends on the state realized when young. The lack of uncertainty about the monetary
transfer ensures that the model is fully analytically tractable13.
The initial stocks of money will be denoted as M¯ `.
2.3 Households
The utility function of an agent born in country h in state s is:
max
lh(s),ch(s′|s),mh(s)
Uh(s) ≡ − lh(s)
1+η
1 + η
+
∑
s′
f(s′|s)[a1h(s) log c1h(s′|s) + a2h(s) log c2h(s′|s)] (2)
13In Lucas (1982), agents face random monetary transfers in the future but it is assumed that there exists a set of claims to
all future monetary transfers, so that agents can fully insure against the monetary policy shocks and markets are complete.
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where lh(s) is the labor supply, ch(s
′|s) := (c1h(s′|s), c2h(s′|s)) is a consumption vector,
mh(s) := (m
1
h(s),m
2
h(s)) is a portfolio of currencies and a
`
h(s) is the weight assigned to
good `.
The timing works as follows. Firstly, agents earn a wage by supplying their labour
(to domestic firms) and spend it buying a portfolio of currencies to fund next period’s
consumption. Next, the state of nature realizes. After learning about the state of the
economy, each agent uses currency 1 (2) to buy good 1 (2).
More formally, agents are subject to the following constraints:
m1h(s
t) + e(st)m2h(s
t) = wh(s
t)
p`(st+1|st)c`h(s′|s) = m`h(st) + T `h(st+1|st) ∀ st+1, `
where wh(s
t) is agent h’s nominal wealth. The wealth of agent 1 and 2 is respectively
equal to their labour income: w1(s
t) ≡ l1(s)ω1(st) and w2(st) ≡ e(st)l2(s)ω2(st). In the
budget constraint of the young, nominal variables are converted in units of the nume´raire
(currency 1). p`(st+1|st) is the price of good ` tomorrow, conditionally on today’s event
being st. As we previously mentioned, agents only receive a nominal transfer from the
domestic central bank: T `h(s
t+1|st) = 0 if ` 6= h. Note that our timing imply that the old
face two budget constraints in each state of nature.
For convenience, we rewrite the budget constraints as follows. The relative price of
good ` in terms of good 1 (expressed in units of the same currency), otherwise known as
the terms of trade of the economy, can be defined as: ε(st) ≡ p2(st)e(st)
p1(st)
. Therefore, we
divide the budget constraint of the young by p1(st) and the budget constraint of the old
by p`(st+1|st) and use ε(st) to rewrite the constraints as:
m˜1h(s
t) + ε(st)m˜2h(s
t) = w˜h(s
t) (3)
c`h(s
′|s) = m˜
`
h(s
t)
1 + pi`(st+1|st) + T˜
`
h(s
t+1|st) ∀ st+1, ` (4)
where m˜`h(s
t) ≡ m`h(st)
p`(st)
, T˜ `h(s
t+1|st) ≡ T `h(st+1|st)
p`(st+1|st) and pi
`(st+1|st) is the inflation rate in
terms of good `. The real wealth of agent 1 and 2 are respectively w˜1(s
t) ≡ l1(s)ω˜1(st)
and w˜2(s
t) ≡ ε(st)l2(s)ω˜2(st). The solution to the above maximisation problem can be
found in the Appendix.
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2.4 Stationary equilibrium
Definition 1 A stationary equilibrium is a system of prices ε(st) ∈ R++, p(s0) ∈ R2++ and
pi`(st) ∈ R2++ for every st, labour supply lh(s) for every h and s, consumption allocations
ch(s
′|s) ∈ R2++ for every h and any pair of s′, s and portfolio allocations m˜h(st) ∈ R2++
for every st such that:
(i) Agent h maximizes his utility function (2) subject to the budget constraints (3) and
(4) in every st;
(ii) Firms maximise their profits for every st and `;
(iii)
∑
h c
`
h(s|s′) = y`(s) ∀ s, s′ and ∀ `
(iv)
∑
h m˜
`
h(s
t) = M˜ `(st) ∀ st, `
(v) L1(st) = l1(s) L
2(st) = l2(s)
As labour markets are closed, labour demand is already pinned down by the other
conditions. Hence, conditions (v) are already satisfied. Moreover, that also implies that
the real wage of each agent is equal to domestic productivity: ω˜1(s
t) = Z1(s) and ω˜2(s
t) =
Z2(s).
In the next Proposition, we show how we can considerably simplify and reduce the
equilibrium system to get a closed form solution for the stationary equilibrium of the
economy.
Proposition 1 The stationary equilibrium of the economy is fully characterized by the
following equations:
l1(s) =
1
(1+µ1(s))
1
1+η
l2(s) =
1
(1+µ2(s))
1
1+η
c11(s
′|s) = aH1 (s)Z1(s′)
(1+µ1(s′))
1
1+η
c21(s
′|s) = aF2 (s)Z2(s′)
(1+µ2(s′))
1
1+η
c12(s
′|s) = aF1 (s)Z1(s′)
(1+µ1(s′))
1
1+η
c22(s
′|s) = aH2 (s)Z2(s′)
(1+µ2(s′))
1
1+η
(5)
Proposition 1 shows that monetary policy is not neutral in our model, as each central
bank can affect the labor supply decision of the domestic agents by changing µ`(s). If
the young know that they will receive a positive transfer from the domestic central bank
when old, then they have an incentive to work less because of a positive wealth effect.
However, output in the two countries would decrease, hence a higher monetary transfer
would have a detrimental effects in terms of consumption for both countries. This is
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the basic trade-off that optimal policy will face, both in non-cooperative and cooperative
environments.
Let us now derive the equation which shows the behaviour of the nominal exchange
rate in equilibrium. In the Appendix, we derive the equilibrium terms of trade of the
economy, which depend on the productivity and the demand shocks, as well as on the
monetary policy transfers:
ε(s) =
a21(s)
a12(s)
Z1(s)
Z2(s)
(
1 + µ1(s)
1 + µ2(s)
) η
1+η
We also show that the real money balances of each currency are equal to the domestically
produced output. Hence, the two nominal prices at each event can be calculated as follows:
p`(st) =
M `(st)
y`(s)
=
M `(st)
Z`(s)L`(s)
=
M `(st)(1 + µ`(s))
1
1+η
Z`(s)
using the solution for labour supplies above. The inflation rates between any two periods
are therefore:
pi`(s′|s) = p
`(st+1|st)
p`(st)
− 1 = Z
`(s)
Z`(s′)
(1 + µ`(s′))− 1 (6)
Price growth depends on productivity growth as well as on the current monetary transfer.
Notice that each central bank will indirectly set the rate of inflation by choosing µ`(s′)
optimally.
Given the above, the nominal exchange rate obeys the following equation:
e(st) ≡ ε(s)p
1(st)
p2(st)
=
M1(st)
M2(st)
a21(s)
a12(s)
1 + µ1(s)
1 + µ2(s)
(7)
The behaviour of the nominal exchange rate depends on three sets of variables: (1) the
relative money supplies, which carry information about the history of the economy; (2)
the relative demand for the foreign good in the current state of nature; (3) the relative
monetary transfers in the current state.
In particular, currency 1 depreciates (e rises) whenever the current demand for the
foreign good is relatively higher with respect to the past and the domestic central bank’s
monetary policy is more expansionary. As the demand for the foreign good rises with
respect to the past, agents will demand more foreign currency leading to the domestic
currency’s depreciation. An expansionary monetary policy means that, as domestic agents
expect to receive a transfer in the future, they have an incentive to work less and output
falls. This implies that the domestic good becomes relatively more expensive. But then,
agents have an incentive to demand less currency 1 as they expect higher inflation in good
1. Therefore, currency 1 depreciates in equilibrium.
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We conclude this section by discussing why a stationary equilibrium exists in this
framework. This is not obvious given the result of Spear (1985), who showed that a sta-
tionary equilibrium does not generically exist in pure exchange stochastic OLG economies
with multiple goods. In an OLG model, S2 equations need to clear for each good as the
aggregate consumption c`(s|s′) depends not just on the current state s but also on the
state in which agents are born s′ (see Definition 1). In Spear (1985)’s closed economy
framework, the number of equations that need to clear are then (L− 1)S2 in the goods’
markets (once one applies Walras Law) and S equations in the money market, while the
number of unknowns is LS, i.e. the prices of the two goods expressed in currency units.
Spear’s non-existence result is then related to the fact that there are too many equations
with respect to the number of unknowns. Notice that this issue does not arise in a model
with one commodity (L = 1).
In our two-currency economy, the number of equations which need to clear is even
higher as the number of equations in the money markets is 2S instead of S. The number
of unknowns is also higher as, besides 2S nominal prices, we need to solve for S relative
prices i.e. to solve for the terms of trade in each state of nature (nominal exchange rates
are pinned down as a result). This still leaves us with too many equations with respect
to the number of unknowns. However, we show in Step 3 of Proposition 1 that only S
equations in the goods’ markets are actually independent. Since each currency can only
buy the local good, the real money balances of each currency are equal to the domestic
output, hence they only depend on the current state:
y`(s) = M˜ `(s)
Using the budget constraints, we can then argue that the aggregate consumption of each
good does not depend on the past:
c`(s|s′) = M˜ `(s) ⇒ c`(s|s′) = c`(s)
This means that we can get rid of S2 − S equations in the goods’ markets. As a con-
sequence, we are left with an equilibrium system of S + 2S independent equations and
unknowns. This implies that a stationary equilibrium exists.
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3 (Conditionally) Pareto optimal allocations
Before analysing optimal policy in our framework, we characterise the set of Pareto op-
timal allocation. In order to do so, we use the concept of Conditional Pareto Optimality
(CPO), first proposed by Muench (1977). Under this welfare criterion, in a stationary
equilibrium agents are distinguished not only by type but also by the event occurring
at their birth. CPO allocations have the property that, conditionally on being born in
a particular state of nature, agents can insure against all risks they face after they are
born. Hence, markets are said to be sequentially complete. Given the sequential nature
of trading, the notion that agents can also insure against the risk they face when they are
born (ex-ante optimality) is highly unrealistic. CPO optimality, although weaker than
ex-ante optimality, seems a more suitable benchmark in an OLG framework14.
Hence, we set up a social welfare function where agents are distinguished by their
country of birth and the state of nature they face when they are born. In particular, we
assume that the planner can directly choose the consumption allocation and the labour
supply of all agents so to maximise a weighted sum of the utility of all agents, subject to
the feasibility constraints and the production functions of the two countries:
max
c1(s|s′),c2(s|s′),l1(s),l2(s)
W P =
∑
s
γP1 (s)U1(s) +
∑
s
γP2 (s)U2(s) (8)
where
∑
s γ
P
1 (s) +
∑
s γ
P
2 (s) = 1. Agent 1 and agent 2’s consumption allocations are
respectively c1(s|s′) := (c11(s|s′), c21(s|s′)) and c2(s|s′) := (c12(s|s′), c22(s|s′)). This is subject
to:
c11(s|s′) + c12(s|s′) = y1(s) ∀ s, s′ (9)
c21(s|s′) + c22(s|s′) = y2(s) ∀ s, s′ (10)
y1(s) = Z1(s)l1(s) ∀ s (11)
y2(s) = Z2(s)l2(s) ∀ s (12)
From now onwards, let us define the weight attached to the domestic good as the degree
of home bias of a country, which can be interpreted as the degree of openness of the
economy: a11(s) ≡ aH1 (s) and a22(s) ≡ aH2 (s), where aFh (s) ≡ 1− aHh (s) for h = 1, 2.
14See Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (199) for a discussion.
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In the Appendix, we show how to find the set of CPO allocations:
lP1 (s) =
[∑
s′ f(s|s′)(γP1 (s′)aH1 (s′) + γP2 (s′)aF2 (s′))
γP1 (s)
] 1
1+η
(13)
c1P1 (s|s′) =
γP1 (s
′)aH1 (s
′)
γP1 (s
′)aH1 (s′) + γ
P
2 (s
′)aF2 (s′)
lP1 (s)Z
1(s) (14)
c1P2 (s|s′) =
γP2 (s
′)aF2 (s
′)
γP1 (s
′)aH1 (s′) + γ
P
2 (s
′)aF2 (s′)
lP1 (s)Z
1(s) (15)
lP2 (s) =
[∑
s′ f(s|s′)(γP2 (s′)aH2 (s′) + γP1 (s′)aF1 (s′))
γP2 (s)
] 1
1+η
(16)
c2P2 (s|s′) =
γP2 (s
′)aH2 (s
′)
γP2 (s
′)aH2 (s′) + γ
P
1 (s
′)aF1 (s′)
lP2 (s)Z
2(s) (17)
c2P1 (s|s′) =
γP1 (s
′)aF1 (s
′)
γP2 (s
′)aH2 (s′) + γ
P
1 (s
′)aF1 (s′)
lP2 (s)Z
2(s) (18)
The higher is the weight assigned to an agent born in a given state s, the lower will be
the amount of labour that the planner will require such agent to supply since labour effort
decreases utility. On the other hand, labour supply in a given country (and therefore,
output) increases with the weights of all the agents that might consume the good in state
s and their relative preference for the good. In allocating the output of each good across
agents, the planner takes into account the weights given to the two agents as well as their
relative preference for the good.
3.1 Sequentially incomplete markets
The following Proposition shows that the competitive equilibrium of the economy is CPO
only in very special cases. In other words, markets are generically sequentially incom-
plete15.
Firstly, let us introduce the following definition:
Definition 2
aF2 (s)
aF1 (s)
≡ A(s).
Definition 3 When A(s) ≡ A, we say that demand shocks are perfectly symmetric.
Definition 3 implies that
aF2 (s)
aF2 (s
′) =
aF1 (s)
aF1 (s
′) for every s, s
′. This means that if e.g. there is
an increase in demand for the foreign good in country 2, an identical increase in demand
for the foreign good will occur in country 1.
15For competitive equilibrium, we refer to a situation where monetary authorities are inactive after the first period:
µ1(s) = µ2(s) = 0.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that central banks are inactive (µ1(s) = µ2(s) = 0). The com-
petitive equilibrium of the economy is CPO if and only if demand shocks are perfectly
symmetric.
The above Proposition shows that markets are effectively sequentially complete (i.e.
the competitive equilibrium is a CPO allocation) only if demand shocks are perfectly
symmetric across countries, i.e. the change in demand for the foreign good across states
is the same across countries. The condition for conditional Pareto optimality identified
above includes the following cases: (1) preferences do not vary over time within country:
aFh (s) = a
F
h for every h; (2) preferences are identical across countries: a
F
1 (s) = a
F
2 (s) for
every s.
It is interesting to observe that, if the fundamentals of the economy are such that
markets are effectively sequentially complete, the exchange rate is constant across states
of nature. In fact, equation (7) would become:
e(st) = e¯ =
M¯1
M¯2
A
More generally, the competitive equilibrium is not CPO: typically, the economy will
exhibit exchange rate volatility and such volatility is suboptimal.
This result has important implications as it shows that, generically, there is scope for
monetary policy to improve on the competitive equilibrium. Whether monetary policy is
able to restore conditional Pareto optimality and under which conditions, as well as the
implications for the behaviour of the nominal exchange rate, is the subject of investigation
of the following sections.
4 Optimal monetary policy
Firstly, we analyse the case where each central bank only cares about the welfare of
domestic residents. Therefore, we set up a non-cooperative game between the two central
banks. We assume that each central bank forms an expectation about the monetary
policy adopted by the other central bank and, taking the policy of the other central bank
as given, chooses the vector of monetary transfers that maximises its welfare function,
which is a weighted sum of the utility function of the domestic agents born in different
states.
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The welfare functions of the two central banks can be written as follows:
W1 =
∑
s
γN1 (s)U1(s) (19)
W2 =
∑
s
γN2 (s)U2(s) (20)
where
∑
s γ
N
h (s) = 1. Let us recall that the labour supply decisions and the consump-
tion allocations in the decentralized economy for agents born in country 1 and 2 are
respectively16:
l1(s) =
1
(1 + µ1(s))
1
1+η
c11(s
′|s) = a
H
1 (s)Z
1(s′)
(1 + µ1(s′))
1
1+η
c21(s
′|s) = a
F
2 (s)Z
2(s′)
(1 + µ2(s′))
1
1+η
(21)
l2(s) =
1
(1 + µ2(s))
1
1+η
c12(s
′|s) = a
F
1 (s)Z
1(s′)
(1 + µ1(s))
1
1+η
c22(s
′|s) = a
H
2 (s)Z
2(s′)
(1 + µ2(s))
1
1+η
(22)
Proposition 3 The unique Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative monetary policy game
between the central banks is:
µ1N(s) =
γN1 (s)∑
s′ f(s|s′)γN1 (s′)aH1 (s′)
− 1 ∀ s (23)
µ2N(s) =
γN2 (s)∑
s′ f(s|s′)γN2 (s′)aH2 (s′)
− 1 ∀ s (24)
The monetary transfer in a given state of nature depends on three variables: (1) the
home bias of all domestic agents; (2) the conditional probabilities that such state of
nature occurs; (3) the distribution of weights assigned to the domestic agents. Firstly, the
higher is the degree of home bias of domestic agents the lower is the monetary transfer.
If domestic agents attach a high weight to the domestic good, the central bank has an
incentive to boost domestic output and therefore it decreases the monetary transfers so
16See Proposition 1.
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that domestic agents supply more labour. Secondly, if a particular state of nature is more
likely to occur conditionally on the other states, then agents have a high probability to
end up in that particular state when old and therefore domestic output must be increased
by decreasing the monetary transfer. Finally, if the central bank assigns a higher weight
to the agent born in a particular state as compared to the others, then the monetary
transfer would rise so as to increase the leisure (and therefore utility) of that agent.
Notice that each central bank has the incentive to set a positive rate of money growth,
hence to generate inflation (equation (6)) and an exchange rate depreciation (equation (7))
as compared to a situation where central banks are inactive. It can also be observed that
central banks’ actions impose a negative spillover to the other country, as the consumption
of the foreign good would fall (equation (5)).
Let us now suppose that the two central banks cooperate delegating their decisions to
a world central bank that chooses the monetary transfers in the two countries µ`(s) to
maximise the following global welfare function:
W =
∑
s
γC1 (s)U1(s) +
∑
s
γC2 (s)U2(s) (25)
where
∑
s γ
C
1 (s) +
∑
s γ
C
2 (s) = 1. This is subject to the equilibrium equations (21) and
(22)17.
Proposition 4 Under cooperation, the optimal monetary transfers are:
µ1C(s) =
γC1 (s)∑
s′ f(s|s′)[γC1 (s′)aH1 (s′) + γC2 (s′)aF2 (s′)]
− 1 ∀ s (26)
µ2C(s) =
γC2 (s)∑
s′ f(s|s′)[γC2 (s′)aH2 (s′) + γC1 (s′)aF1 (s′)]
− 1 ∀ s (27)
The crucial difference with the non-cooperative game is that the cooperating central
banks take into account the demand of each country for the foreign good. Hence, they
internalize the negative effect that an expansionary monetary policy has on the consump-
tion level (and therefore utility) of foreign agents. As a result, the optimal monetary
transfers are always lower under cooperation. This implies that aggregate output in the
two countries would always increase if we moved from a Nash equilibrium to a cooperative
17Notice that while the social welfare function is the same as the planner’s in section 3, central banks cannot directly
choose the consumption allocation and labour supply but have to operate with their monetary policy instruments, subject
to the equilibrium restrictions.
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environment. However, higher output means that agents are required to work more and
enjoy less leisure. In a later section, we will then ask whether cooperation actually implies
welfare gains for every agent in the economy.
Let us now study how the allocations which can be implemented by central banks
through optimal policy relate to CPO allocations.
Firstly, we check our intuition that non-cooperative policies lead to a suboptimal equi-
librium proving the following result:
Proposition 5 The Nash equilibrium is conditionally Pareto suboptimal.
Secondly, we compare the allocations which can be achieved through cooperation with
CPO allocations.
Proposition 6 Cooperative policies can implement the first-best allocation for weights in
the social welfare function (25) equal to: γC1 (s) = γ
P
1 (s), γ
C
2 (s) = γ
P
2 (s) and
γC1 (s)
γC2 (s)
=
aF2 (s)
aF1 (s)
for every s.
Corollary 1 The implementation of a first-best allocation requires that the domestic and
the foreign agent are weighted differently, unless they are identical.
Proposition 6 shows that cooperation between the two central banks can effectively
“complete the markets”, as it is possible to reach a first-best, CPO allocation through
the monetary policy instruments. This can be done by choosing an appropriate vector of
weights in the welfare function. More generally, the first and the second-best frontiers are
not identical since central banks are constrained by their monetary policy instruments.
While the set of output allocations which can be implemented through cooperation are
identical to those achievable by the planner, the two central banks are generically not
able to reach a first-best consumption distribution unless they choose weights in a certain
manner18. In order to achieve that, they should give a higher weight to the agent with
the lowest demand for the foreign good (or the economy which is relatively more closed).
Since this implies that the global demand for the domestically produced good is higher,
then the agent is required to work relatively more than the other agent to satisfy the
demand. Hence, his utility loss (deriving from the fall in leisure) should be compensated
by giving him a higher weight in the welfare function. One of the main implications of
the model is that the domestic and the foreign agent should not be treated equally if one
18See the Proof for more details.
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wants to implement the first-best. Only if countries have the same degree of home bias,
then a utilitarian welfare function would enable the two central banks to reach the Pareto
frontier through their monetary policy instruments.
Our result then points at a novel reason behind the lack of monetary policy cooper-
ation among central banks. In order to cooperate, it goes without saying that central
banks should agree on the social welfare function to maximise. Although the prospect
of effectively “completing the markets” appealing, it is unlikely that the central bank of
that country whose agent must be assigned a lower weight would agree to the monetary
policies associated with the implementation of the first-best. In section 6, we will dis-
cuss this point further when analyzing the welfare consequences of moving from the Nash
equilibrium to a cooperative outcome.
5 Exchange rate volatility and welfare
In this section, our objective is to draw some welfare conclusions on the behaviour of
the nominal exchange rate. Equation (7) shows that there are two relevant sources of
shocks in the model: demand shocks and monetary policy shocks. In the case of non-
cooperation, the monetary transfers are set optimally. However, does central banks’
competition increase or decrease the volatility of the exchange rate as compared to a
scenario where central banks are inactive and the exchange rate only moves with the
demand shocks? Moreover, what would cooperation among central banks imply for the
volatility of the exchange rate? The aim of this section is to answer these questions by
comparing the volatility of the nominal exchange rate under three different scenarios: (1)
non-cooperation; (2) cooperation; (3) only demand shocks (inactive central banks).
Notice that the nominal exchange rate is not a stationary variable: while it depends on
the current realization of the demand and the monetary policy transfers, it also depends
on the history of the economy as summarized by the current stocks of money supplies. To
calculate volatility, it is then convenient to transform the variable and make it stationary.
We will follow two approaches in calculating the volatility of the nominal exchange rate.
Firstly, we make the following normalisation:
Definition 4 e˜(s) ≡ e(st)M2(st)
M1(st)
.
We basically ask, given the same history of the economy, whether the exchange rate
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is more or less volatile as a result of the possible values that monetary transfers can
take under different policy scenarios. This comparison works very well at t = 0, since
the money stocks are identical across regimes. We are aware that calculating exchange
rate volatility on the basis of this measure is imperfect: at any other moment in time,
the relative money supplies would be different across regimes for the same history of
the shocks. However, the advantage of this definition is that volatility can be computed
analytically. As a result, it will provide a lot of intuition on how central banks respond
to demand shocks both under non-cooperation and cooperation.
After showing a ranking of exchange rate volatility under the three policy environments,
we turn to a definition of volatility that takes into account the paths of money supplies.
In particular, we calculate volatility as the standard deviation of the first-difference of the
logarithm of the nominal exchange rate (see e.g. Tenreyro, 2007). We find numerically
that the ranking that we obtain under Definition 4 is still valid under this transformation
of the nominal exchange rate. For robustness purposes, we consider both the case of
symmetric and asymmetric shocks.
5.1 Asymmetric shocks
Firstly, we analyse the case of asymmetric shocks. To make some progress on the issue
of exchange rate volatility, we must make some assumptions on the weights selected by
the central banks under optimal policy, as well as specify the parameters of the economy
a bit further. Under non-cooperation, we assume that each central bank treats domestic
agents equally:
γNh (s) = γ
N
h
In the case of cooperation, we consider the case where the two central banks decide to
implement the CPO allocation, hence they set weights as specified by Proposition 6.
We then assume that the two central banks decide to assign the same weight to agents
born in country 1 but in different states19:
γCPO1 (s) = γ
CPO
1
To facilitate the calculation of volatility, we consider a scenario where there are only two
19Note that weights in country 2 are functions of γCPO1 (s) according to Proposition 6. Since different values for γ
CPO
1 (s)
would correspond to a different CPO allocation, we need to make an assumption on the weights assigned to agents born in
country 1 to select a particular allocation and compare with the other policy scenarios.
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states of nature and the transition probability matrix is specified as follows:
Π =
 f(1|1) f(2|1)
f(1|2) f(2|2)
 =
 p 1− p
1− p p

Moreover, demand in the two countries evolves as follows:
aH1 (1) = a
H
1 + z1
aH1 (2) = a
H
1 − z1
aH2 (1) = a
H
2 − z2
aH2 (2) = a
H
2 + z2
where zh > 0. Therefore, an increase in the demand for the domestic good in one country
corresponds to a decrease in the demand for the domestic good in the other.
We then show that the variance of the nominal exchange rate e˜ in the three scenarios
can be ranked as follows:
Proposition 7 When shocks are asymmetric, V AR(e˜N) > V AR(e˜D) > V AR(e˜CPO) 6=
0.
e˜N denotes the nominal exchange rate under non-cooperation, e˜CPO refers to the exchange
rate in a situation where the two central banks implement the first-best allocation, while
e˜D is the exchange rate in a scenario where the two central banks are inactive (µ1(s) =
µ2(s) = 0) and the exchange rate only moves with the demand shocks.
In order to give some intuition about the result, it is useful to show the realisations of
the nominal exchange rate under the non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios:
e˜N(1) =
1− aH1 − z1
1− aH2 + z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand in state 1
· a
H
2 − z2(2p− 1)
aH1 + z1(2p− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-cooperative policies in state 1
e˜N(2) =
1− aH1 + z1
1− aH2 − z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand in state 2
· a
H
2 + z2(2p− 1)
aH1 − z1(2p− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-cooperative policies in state 2
e˜CPO(1) =
1− aH1 − z1
1− aH2 + z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand in state 1
·
p
1−aH1 −z1
1−aH2 +z2
+ (1− p)1−aH1 +z1
1−aH2 −z2
1−aH1 −z1
1−aH2 +z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
cooperative policy in state 1
= pe˜D(1) + (1− p)e˜D(2)
e˜CPO(2) =
1− aH1 + z1
1− aH2 − z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand in state 2
·
p
1−aH1 +z1
1−aH2 −z2
+ (1− p)1−aH1 −z1
1−aH2 +z2
1−aH1 +z1
1−aH2 −z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
cooperative policy in state 2
= pe˜D(2) + (1− p)e˜D(1)
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Proposition 7 shows that competition among central banks create even more volatility
than demand shocks alone. The intuition behind this is the following. In state 1, it
can observed that currency 1 appreciates (e is low) since there is a growth in demand
for good 1. This is caused by an increase both in domestic and foreign demand: not
only domestic agents have a higher demand for the domestic good but foreign agents
have a lower demand for the domestic good (hence, higher for the foreign good). An
increase in the global demand for good 1 means that currency 1 is more desirable, hence it
appreciates in equilibrium. In a non-cooperative environment, both central banks would
implement an expansionary policy. However, the monetary policy in country 1 is less
expansionary as compared to country 2 since agents born in country 1 need to work more
to satisfy the increase in the demand (although they only care about domestic demand).
Hence, currency 1 appreciates even further. When central banks cooperate, agents born in
country 1 carry a higher weight in the social welfare function. As we explained before, it
is recognised that their leisure falls because they need to work more to satisfy the increase
in the demand for the good they produce. As a consequence, monetary policy becomes
relatively more expansionary in country 1 to counteract the effect of the positive demand
shock. The opposite occurs instead in state 2.
Under cooperation, central banks “lean against the wind” as they carry out a relatively
more expansionary policy in the country whose currency appreciates. Notice also that
central banks implement a sort of “exchange rate smoothing”, since the nominal exchange
rate under cooperation is a weighted average of the exchange rate in the two states of
nature (when volatility is only triggered by demand shocks). Unless the two states are
equally as likely (p = 1
2
), central banks would not smooth the demand shocks perfectly
but they would take into account the degree of persistence in the economy20.
Finally, we simulate the model 1,000 times and calculate the average standard deviation
of the first-difference of the log of the nominal exchange rate. We assume that the shock
and the home bias parameter are the same across countries: z1 = z2 = z and a
H
1 = a
H
2 =
aH . The shock is a 1% increase in demand for the domestic good, and the home bias is
set to aH = 0.8. The results are reported in Table 1. It can be observed that the ranking
that we provided in Proposition 7 is still valid once we take into account the different
paths of money supply. As expected, volatility decreases with the degree of persistence
20Central banks would also smooth the shocks perfectly if the stochastic process was i.i.d. In fact, p = 1
2
is just an
example of an i.i.d. process.
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Table 1: Volatility of the nominal exchange rate under different policy scenarios: asymmetric shocks
p = 0.5 p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.8 p = 0.9
Nash equilibrium 0.1131 0.1038 0.0923 0.0778 0.0576
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Demand shocks only 0.1012 0.1013 0.0877 0.0717 0.0505
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Cooperation 0.08 0.0784 0.0733 0.0641 0.0479
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes. (a) Exchange rate volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the first-difference of the
logarithm of the exchange rate e(st). (b) Exchange rate volatility is calculated as the average standard
deviation of the variable across 1,000 simulations. (c) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. (d)
The initial state is assumed to be 1. The parameter values are chosen as follows: M1(s0) = M2(s0) = 1,
aH1 = a
H
2 = 0.8 and z1 = z2 = 0.01× aH .
(p) in the economy.
Table 1 shows that the nominal exchange rate is volatile even in a CPO allocation.
Hence, our model suggests that some volatility of the nominal exchange rate can be
harmless. However, cooperation brings this volatility to a minimum by taking care of the
excess volatility due to the demand shocks as well as the incentives of central banks’ in a
non-cooperative environment.
5.2 Symmetric shocks
In this section, we consider the case of symmetric shocks.
We keep the same setting as above but demand shocks are now specified as follows:
aH1 (1) = a
H
1 + z1
aH1 (2) = a
H
1 − z1
aH2 (1) = a
H
2 + z2
aH2 (2) = a
H
2 − z2
In other words, the two countries simultaneously experience either an increase or a
decrease of demand for the domestic good.
Proposition 8 When shocks are symmetric, V AR(e˜N) > V AR(e˜D) > V AR(e˜CPO) 6= 0.
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Proposition 8 shows that the volatility ranking obtained in the case of asymmetric shocks
also applies to the case of symmetric shocks. In state 1, both countries face an increase in
demand for the domestic good. Whether the domestic currency will appreciate or not will
depend on the relative size of the shock as well as the ex-ante levels of home bias. Suppose
that the countries are ex-ante identical but country 1 faces a relatively larger shock. As a
result, currency 1 will appreciate in state 1 and depreciate in state 2. Both central banks
would carry out a less expansionary policy in state 1 while a more expansionary policy in
state 2, in order to incentivize domestic agents to work more in state 1 and less in state 2.
Therefore, what would be the net effect on the nominal exchange rate? As country 1 faces
a relatively larger shock, then its policies need to be more aggressive: hence, currency 1
would appreciates (depreciates) even more in state 1 (2) as compared to the case where
central banks are inactive. As in the case of asymmetric shocks, cooperation would just
smooth the effects of the demand shocks on the nominal exchange rate away. Therefore,
for e.g. country 1, cooperation implies a relatively more expansionary policy in state 1
and a less expansionary one in state 2 as compared to country 2.
In Table 2, we compute the volatility of the nominal exchange rate under the three
scenarios. As above, we assume that the two countries have an ex-ante level of home bias
equal to 0.8. However, the size of the shock in the two countries needs to be different for
demand shocks to generate any volatility of the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, we
assume that country 1 faces an increase (decrease) of 2% in the demand for the domestic
good in state 1 (2), while country 2 only of 1%.
Since shocks are symmetric, the nominal exchange rate is less volatile as compared to
the case of asymmetric shocks. However, it is still the case that non-cooperation produces
the highest volatility, while cooperation the lowest.
6 From the Nash equilibrium to a cooperative outcome
In section 4, we have shown that output is always higher under cooperation. However,
higher output does not only imply higher consumption but also lower leisure. In this
section, we will then ask two main questions. Firstly, is moving from the Nash equilibrium
to a CPO allocation through cooperation Pareto improving? In other words, do all agents
gain from moving from the Nash equilibrium to a cooperative allocation? Secondly, is it
really worth cooperating from a quantitative point of view?
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Table 2: Volatility of the nominal exchange rate under different policy scenarios: symmetric shocks
p = 0.5 p = 0.6 p = 0.7 p = 0.8 p = 0.9
Nash equilibrium 0.0568 0.0520 0.0462 0.0390 0.0289
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Demand shocks only 0.0568 0.0508 0.0439 0.0359 0.0254
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Cooperation 0.0401 0.0393 0.0368 0.0321 0.0241
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes. (a) Exchange rate volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the first-difference of the
logarithm of the exchange rate e(st). (b) Exchange rate volatility is calculated as the average standard
deviation of the variable across 1,000 simulations. (c) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. (d)
The initial state is assumed to be 1. The parameter values are chosen as follows: M1(s0) = M2(s0) = 1,
aH1 = a
H
2 = 0.8, z1 = 0.02× aH , and z2 = 0.01× aH .
6.1 The welfare consequences of cooperation
Our hypothesis is that central banks cooperate to implement the first-best i.e. the CPO
allocation. The strategy of the proof is then to show that ∆Uh(s) ≡ UCPOh (s)−UNh (s) > 0
for every h and s when zh → 0. Since the result holds for sufficiently small shocks, the
type of shock (symmetric or asymmetric) does not really matter.
Proposition 9 Given aH1 , all agents are better off under cooperation than under non-
cooperation for an open set around aH2 = a
H
1 for zh → 0.
Proposition 9 shows that both countries would gain from moving from a non-cooperative
to a cooperative environment as long as countries are sufficiently similar. As an illustra-
tive example, we set aH1 = 0.8 and draw ∆U1 and ∆U2 as functions of a
H
2 in Figure 1.
When countries have the same degree of openness, the dotted and the solid lines intersect
implying that the countries experience the same welfare gains. However, if the countries
are too heterogeneous then one of the two might be worse off. Utility in country 1 (2)
falls (increases) as country 2 becomes more closed. If country 2 is less open than country
1, then country 2 gains at the expense of country 1 (Region 3). The reason is that a high
weight must be given to country 2 to compensate for the fall in leisure resulting from the
high demand for the domestic good. If country 2 is more open than country 1, then the
opposite occurs (Region 1).
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Figure 1: The welfare consequences of cooperation for aH1 = 0.8
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One might be tempted to argue that, after all, cooperation is more likely between
countries whose degree of home bias is very similar, such as developed countries. Hence,
in reality, cooperating countries would always lie within Region 2, where the first-best
allocation is Pareto improving on the Nash equilibrium. However, the degree of home
bias is often set in calibration exercises either to 0.8 or 0.921. Therefore, a situation where
one of the cooperating countries has a degree of home bias equal to 0.8 while the other
one is 0.9 is not unrealistic at all. In that case, the first-best allocation is not Pareto
improving (Region 3).
When the two countries belong to either Region 1 or in Region 3, one might then
wonder if there are other (second-best) allocations which might make both of them better
off. In order to study those allocations, we assume that the two central banks decide to
treat agents born in the same country but in different states equally and let the relative
weight between the two countries to be the free parameter: γCh (s) = γ
C
h for every h and
21See e.g. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc, 2010; Pappa, 2004. Moreover, it is common to perform robustness exercises with
respect to the consumption home bias.
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s. For zh → 0, the optimal monetary transfers under cooperation are:
µ1Czh→0 =
1
aH1 + γa
F
2
− 1
µ2Czh→0 =
1
aH2 +
aF1
γ
− 1
where γ ≡ γC2
γC1
is the weight given to agents in country 2 relatively to agents in country
1. When the relative weight is set so that γ =
aF1
aF2
, we recover the CPO allocation
analysed above. Following the same steps as for Proposition 9, we can derive the welfare
consequences of cooperation:
∆UC1 zh→0 = −γaF2 + aH1 (log(aH1 + γaF2 )− log(aH1 )) +
+ aF1 (log(a
H
2 +
aF1
γ
)− log(aH2 )) (28)
∆UC2 zh→0 = −
aF1
γ
+ aH2 (log(a
H
2 +
aF1
γ
)− log(aH2 )) +
+ aF2 (log(a
H
1 + γa
F
2 )− log(aH1 )) (29)
It can be observed that the welfare consequences of moving from the Nash equilibrium to
cooperation are generally ambiguous and depend on the degree of home bias of the two
countries, as well as on the relative weight.
As an illustration, we then consider the following example: aH1 = 0.8 while a
H
2 = 0.9.
At these values, we already know that country 1 is worse off when the first-best allocation
is chosen.
In Figure 2, the solid lines represent the Pareto frontiers of the world economy, while the
dotted lines are the second-best frontiers, i.e. the set of all allocations that can be reached
through cooperation with the monetary policy instruments. As shown by Proposition 6,
only when γ = γ2
γ1
=
aF1
aF2
, the two coincides and a first-best allocation can be implemented
through cooperation. We also consider the case where the two central banks cooperate
but give the same weight to both agents: γ = 1. The case of a utilitarian social welfare
function is indeed standard in the literature (see Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc, 2010).
Although this allocation does not belong to the set of CPO allocations, it might still be
Pareto improving as it is a second-best solution.
As country 2’s degree of openness is lower than country 1’s, country 2 loses from
cooperation under “equal weights” (EW). As there is a relatively high demand for good
2, agent 2 works more but it is not compensated by having been assigned a higher weight
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Figure 2: First-best versus second-best policy when aH1 = 0.8 and a
H
2 = 0.9
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in the welfare function (25). In the CPO allocation, central banks would take into account
the countries’ heterogeneity and, as a result, they would set γ1 =
1
3
and γ2 =
2
3
. However,
Figure 2 shows that agent 1 would lose from such policy (see also Figure 1).
Although cooperation cannot implement an allocation that is simultaneously CPO and
Pareto improving on the Nash equilibrium, Figure 2 shows that there is a set of allocations
on the second-best frontier which improve on the Nash equilibrium. Figure 3 illustrates
the weights which correspond to those allocations. Cooperation between the two central
banks would be Pareto improving provided that the relative weight of agent 2 γ is set
between 1.3 and 1.9. This implies that agent 2 should be given a weight between 0.56
and 0.66.
Our example shows that even when countries are quite heterogeneous, there exists a
set of Pareto improving allocations that can be achieved under cooperation. However,
since the two countries should be weighted differently in order to achieve an outcome that
is favorable for both, then it is unlikely that the country which is assigned a lower weight
agrees to the monetary policies required.
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Figure 3: The set of relative weights γ associated with Pareto improvements when aH1 = 0.8 and a
H
2 = 0.9
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Countries’ asymmetries can then explain why international monetary policy cooper-
ation is difficult to achieve. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) argued instead that the reason
behind the lack of cooperation is rather that monetary policy spillovers are a second-order
problem as compared to internal objectives such as price and output stabilization22. The
next section will show that this is not the case in our framework, since the gains from
international monetary cooperation are not negligible.
6.2 The gains from cooperation
Proposition 9 indicates that all agents would gain from a regime of central banks’ coop-
eration for an open set of parameters.
We shall now attempt to quantify those gains. In order to do that, we measure the
welfare gains from cooperation as the percentage increase in wealth that would give agents
under the Nash equilibrium the same level of utility as under cooperation (i.e. Hicksian
equivalent variation).
22A similar point was recently made by Blanchard (2016).
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We then define the welfare of the (global) economy under cooperation and non-cooperation
as follows:
V C=
∑
h
∑
s U
C
h (s)
V N=
∑
h
∑
s U
N
h (s)
where V C is welfare under cooperation and V N is welfare under non-cooperation (Nash
equilibrium). Therefore, we define as φ as the percentage increase in wealth that would
yield a level of total welfare under the Nash equilibrium equal to welfare in a cooperative
outcome. This implies that:
φ = (exp(V C − V N)− 1)× 100
We set our baseline parameters consistently with the literature (see e.g. Pappa (2004)
and Rabitsch (2012)). We quantify the gains both in the case of asymmetric and sym-
metric shocks, modelling the demand shocks as in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 3: Parameter Values
Home bias aH = 0.8
Persistence p = 0.9
Inverse of labour elasticity η = 3
Both in the case of asymmetric and symmetric shocks, the welfare gains are a non-
negligible 0.6% in terms of equivalent consumption. This result is at odds with the
New Keynesian literature, which typically finds that the welfare gains from cooperation
are extremely small23. The comparison is especially striking considering that our utility
function is logarithmic. In a New Keynesian setting, the gains from cooperation are
exactly zero in this case24.
In fact, our paper proposes a entirely different mechanism through which monetary
policy can have real effects. The OLG structure implies that changes in money supply
have an impact on the agents’ budget constraints, since only part of the population receives
the monetary transfer from the domestic central bank. Under these circumstances, agents’
23See e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010), Fujiwara and Wang (2017).
24See also Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
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decisions about how much labour to supply are affected by monetary policies, since the
expectation to receive a monetary transfer in the future generates a positive wealth effect.
On the contrary, let us consider versions of the New Keynesian model where money is
modelled explicitly by entering the utility functions of the agent (e.g. Corsetti and Pesenti,
2005). Wealth effects from monetary policy are absent: changes to the government budget
constraint do not affect the equilibrium equations. This is due to the representative agent
assumption, as well as the assumption that only domestic residents can hold the domestic
currency25.
Figure 4: Welfare gains (%) as the degree of home bias increases
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In Figures 4 and 5, we perform some sensitivity analysis with respect to the degree of
home bias and the labour elasticity26.
Figure 4 illustrates that the maximum gains from cooperation can be achieved when
agents give the same weight to the domestic and the foreign good (full openness). The
welfare gains are almost equal to 5%, therefore they are far from negligible. As the degree
of home bias increases, the gains from cooperation fall. If agents’ preferences are heavily
biased towards the domestic good, then the consumption losses that arise from pursuing
25The incentive to deviate from the cooperative solution in the New Keynesian models hinges instead on the possibility
to manipulate the terms of trade of the economy. As this effect is wiped out in the logarithmic case, then there are no gains
from cooperation when utility is logarithmic. If the elasticity of substitution is different than one, the gains are positive
but still extremely small (see e.g. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc, 2010).
26We do the exercise for the case of asymmetric shocks.
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Figure 5: Welfare gains (%) as labor elasticity falls
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an expansionary monetary policy in the Nash equilibrium are weighted more heavily.
Therefore, central banks do not deviate as much from the cooperative outcome and the
gains from cooperation are smaller.
Figure 5 shows instead how the gains from cooperation vary with the labour elasticity.
Interestingly, the maximum gains from cooperation can be achieved with the labour elas-
ticity approaches infinity (η = 0). As the labour elasticity falls, central banks’ incentive
to deviate from the cooperation outcome is smaller as domestic agents react less to the
central bank’s policy. In fact, it is easy to verify that an increase in the monetary trans-
fer has a smaller effect on labour supply the lower is the elasticity of labour supply (see
equation (5)).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we revisit two central issues for open economies: whether central banks
should care about exchange rate volatility and the gains from monetary policy coopera-
tion. Our model is rich of policy implications.
Firstly, we show that the exchange rate volatility that we observe between any two
currencies might be far too high. Excess exchange rate volatility is the result of two
factors: firstly, it is the outcome of an incomplete markets’ environment, since agents
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are not able to insure against the shocks which are behind exchange rate movements;
secondly, central banks’ policies raise the volatility of the nominal exchange rate when
acting in a non-cooperative environment. Cooperation among central banks would then
achieve two things. Firstly, it would use monetary policy to smooth the effects of shocks to
economic fundamentals on the exchange rate, implementing policies which “lean against
the wind”. Secondly, it would curb the excess volatility associated with non-cooperative
policies. Although cooperation can effectively “complete the markets” by implementing a
first-best allocation, it does not implement a pegged exchange rate or a monetary union.
First-best allocations are still characterized by some degree of exchange rate volatility.
This paper also identifies a new channel through which central banks can impose a
negative spillover to the rest of the world when setting their monetary policy optimally.
Differently from representative agent models, changes in money supply have an effect on
the equilibrium allocation despite prices are fully flexible. In a non-cooperative environ-
ment, central banks have the incentive to devaluate their domestic currency by printing
money supply. By doing so, each of them imposes a negative spillover to the other country
in terms of lower consumption for the foreign good. In this context, we show that gains
from cooperation exist. For commonly used parameter values, these gains amount to a
welfare increase of 0.6% in equivalent consumption. It is important to stress that this
is not a negligible number, considering that we use a logarithmic utility function which
typically gives zero gains from cooperation in other settings (e.g. see Corsetti, Dedola
and Leduc, 2010).
Finally, our model suggests a novel reason for the lack of monetary policy cooperation
among central banks. In order for cooperation to be Pareto improving, some countries
should be prepared to accept that other countries must carry a higher weight in the social
welfare function. Therefore, our analysis implies that a “neutral party”, such as the IMF
or other multinational institutions, might have a role in trying to bring central banks
together to reap the gains from cooperation.
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Appendix
First-order conditions
Decentralized economy
We set up the Lagrangian function to analyze the maximization problem of an agent born
in event st:
Lh(st) = − lh(s)
1+η
1 + η
+
∑
s′
f(s′|s)[a1h(s) log c1h(s′|s) + a2h(s) log c2h(s′|s)] +
+ λh(s
t)[w˜h(s
t)− m˜1h(st)− ε(st)m˜2h(st)] +
+
∑
st+1|st
λh(s
t+1|st) ·
[
m˜h(s
t)
1 + pi(st+1|st) + T˜h(s
t+1|st)− ch(s′|s)
]
The first-order conditions are:
l1(s) : −l1(s)η + λ1(st)ω˜1(st) = 0 (30)
l2(s) : −l2(s)η + λ2(st)ε(st)ω˜2(st) = 0 (31)
c`h(s
′|s) : f(s′|s) a
`
h(s)
c`h(s
′|s) − λ
`
h(s
t+1|st) = 0 ∀ s′ (32)
m˜1h(s
t) : −λh(st) +
∑
st+1|st
λ1h(s
t+1|st)
1 + pi1(st+1|st) = 0 (33)
m˜2h(s
t) : −λh(st)ε(st) +
∑
st+1|st
λ2h(s
t+1|st)
1 + pi2(st+1|st) = 0 (34)
λh(s
t) : w˜h(s
t)− m˜1h(st)− ε(st)m˜2h(st) = 0 (35)
λ`h(s
t+1|st) : m˜
`
h(s
t)
1 + pi`(st+1|st) + T˜
`
h(s
t+1|st)− c`h(s′|s) = 0 ∀ st+1, ` (36)
Planner’s problem
First, we can consolidate (9), (10), (11) and (12) as follows:
c11(s|s′) + c12(s|s′) = Z1(s)l1(s) ∀ s, s′ (37)
c21(s|s′) + c22(s|s′) = Z2(s)l2(s) ∀ s, s′ (38)
Let λ1(s|s′) and λ2(s|s′) be the Lagrange multipliers associated with (37) and (38)
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respectively. The first-order conditions of the problem are:
l1(s) : −γP1 (s)l1(s)η +
∑
s′
λ1(s|s′)Z1(s) = 0 ∀ s (39)
c11(s|s′) :
γP1 (s
′)f(s|s′)aH1 (s′)
c11(s|s′)
= λ1(s|s′) ∀ s, s′ (40)
c12(s|s′) :
γP2 (s
′)f(s|s′)aF2 (s′)
c12(s|s′)
= λ1(s|s′) ∀ s, s′ (41)
l2(s) : −γP2 (s)l2(s)η +
∑
s′
λ2(s|s′)Z2(s) = 0 ∀ s (42)
c21(s|s′) :
γP1 (s
′)f(s|s′)aF1 (s′)
c21(s|s′)
= λ2(s|s′) ∀ s, s′ (43)
c22(s|s′) :
γP2 (s
′)f(s|s′)aH2 (s′)
c22(s|s′)
= λ2(s|s′) ∀ s, s′ (44)
λ1(s|s′) : Z1(s)l1(s)− c11(s|s′)− c12(s|s′) = 0 ∀ s, s′ (45)
λ2(s|s′) : Z2(s)l2(s)− c21(s|s′)− c22(s|s′) = 0 ∀ s, s′ (46)
Combine (40), (41) and (45) to obtain:
c11(s|s′) =
γP1 (s
′)aH1 (s
′)
γP1 (s
′)aH1 (s′) + γ
P
2 (s
′)aF2 (s′)
l1(s)Z
1(s) (47)
To solve for l1(s), plug equation (47) into (40) to get:
f(s|s′)(γP1 (s′)aH1 (s′) + γP2 (s′)aF2 (s′)) = λ1(s|s′)l1(s)Z1(s)
Summing across s′ and using (39), we find the optimal quantity of labour in country 1:
lP1 (s) =
[∑
s′ f(s|s′)(γP1 (s′)aH1 (s′) + γP2 (s′)aF2 (s′))
γP1 (s)
] 1
1+η
Plugging the last equation into (47) and using the feasibility condition (45), we find the
allocation of good 1 between the two agents:
c1P1 (s|s′) =
γP1 (s
′)aH1 (s
′)
γP1 (s
′)aH1 (s′) + γ
P
2 (s
′)aF2 (s′)
lP1 (s)Z
1(s)
c1P2 (s|s′) =
γP2 (s
′)aF2 (s
′)
γP1 (s
′)aH1 (s′) + γ
P
2 (s
′)aF2 (s′)
lP1 (s)Z
1(s)
Following the same steps, we can find the labour supply in country 2 and the consumption
allocation for good 2:
lP2 (s) =
[∑
s′ f(s|s′)(γP2 (s′)aH2 (s′) + γP1 (s′)aF1 (s′))
γP2 (s)
] 1
1+η
c2P2 (s|s′) =
γP2 (s
′)aH2 (s
′)
γP2 (s
′)aH2 (s′) + γ
P
1 (s
′)aF1 (s′)
lP2 (s)Z
2(s)
c2P1 (s|s′) =
γP1 (s
′)aF1 (s
′)
γP2 (s
′)aH2 (s′) + γ
P
1 (s
′)aF1 (s′)
lP2 (s)Z
2(s)
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Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed in a few steps to show the result.
Step 1 - Firstly, we show that the real money balances of currency ` are equal to
domestic output: M˜ `(st) − y`(s) = 0 for every `. This implies that real money balances
are not history dependent M˜ `(st) = M˜ `(s).
Using the fact that ω˜(s)l(s) = Z(s)L(s) = y(s) holds in every country, and assuming
that money markets clear, we can sum across h the budget constraint of the young as
follows:
ε(st)(M˜2(st)− y2(s)) + (M˜1(st)− y1(s)) = 0
Note that ε(st) is strictly positive. We now argue that, in equilibrium, the real money
balances of currency ` are equal to output in country `:
M˜ `(st)− y`(s) = 0 ` = 1, 2
from which it follows that real money balances are not history dependent:
M˜ `(st) = M˜ `(s) ∀ st (48)
On the contrary, suppose that M˜ `(st) − y`(s) 6= 0. Aggregating the budget constraints
of the old in event st, we have that p`(st)c`(s|s′) = (1 + µ`(s))M `(st−). Using equation
(1), this can be rewritten as c`(s|s′) = M˜ `(st). But then, we have by substitution that
c`(s|s′)− y`(s) 6= 0. Therefore, feasibility is violated.
This result allows us to derive the gross rate of inflation for each good:
1 + pi`(st+1|st) ≡ p
`(st+1|st)
p`(st)
=
M `(st+1|st)
M `(st)
y`(s)
y`(s′)
= (1 + µ`(s))
y`(s)
y`(s′)
(49)
As expected, inflation is increasing in money growth and decreasing in output growth.
Using the government budget constraint (1), we can rewrite the monetary transfers
(which only accrue to domestic agents) as follows:
T˜ `(st+1|st) ≡ T
`(st+1|st)
p`(st+1|st) =
T `h(s
t+1|st)
p`(st+1|st)
p`(st)
p`(st)
=
µ`(s)M˜ `(s)
1 + pi`(st+1|st) =
=
µ`(s)y`(s)
1 + pi`(st+1|st) =
µ`(s)l`(s)Z`(s)
1 + pi`(st+1|st) (50)
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Step 2 - From Step 1, we can derive the implication that relative prices do not depend
on the history of the economy: ε(st) = ε(s).
We can combine equations (32), (33) and (34) and obtain the following expression for
relative prices in event st:
ε(st) =
∑
st+1|st
f(s′|s)a2h(s)
c2h(s
′|s)(1+pi2(st+1|st))∑
st+1|st
f(s′|s)a1h(s)
c1h(s
′|s)(1+pi1(st+1|st))
(51)
Plugging the inflation rates (49) into (51), we get:
ε(st) =
∑
s′|s
f(s′|s)a2h(s)
c2h(s
′|s)(1+µ2(s))
y2(s′)
y2(s)∑
s′|s
f(s′|s)a1h(s)
c1h(s
′|s)(1+µ1(s))
y1(s′)
y1(s)
(52)
which implies that relative prices depend on the current and future states, but not on
the past: ε(st) = ε(s). We are therefore left with S relative prices as endogenous variables.
Step 3 - Next, we show that only S goods’ markets equilibrium equations are inde-
pendent.
Suppose that the money markets clear for all events. Consider an event st with the
following characteristics: s is the realized state in that particular event and also in the
previous time period. Aggregate consumption can be written as:
c`(s|s) = M˜ `(st) (53)
Consider also another event st
′
in which the realized state is s but yesterday’s state is
instead s′. Aggregate consumption satisfies the following equation:
c`(s|s′) = M˜ `(st′) (54)
Because of Step 1, we have that M˜ `(st) = M˜ `(st
′
) = M˜ `(s). Hence, c`(s|s′) = c`(s|s) =
M˜ `(s). Suppose that the goods markets equations clear if yesterday’s state is the same
as today:
c`(s|s) = y`(s) (2S equations)
As the aggregate consumption of any good does not depend on the past, c`(s|s′) = y`(s)
automatically clear for s′ 6= s. Therefore, only 2S equations in the goods’ markets are
independent.
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Finally, we can get rid of further S equations by Walras Law. Using our previous
results, the aggregated budget constraint of the young can be rewritten as:
c1(s|s)− y1(s) + ε(s)(c2(s|s)− y2(s)) = 0
If the markets for, say, good 1 clear, then the markets for good 2 do also.
Step 4 - Finally, we can further solve the maximisation problem of both agents.
Rearranging the first-order conditions for h = 1, and using the fact that ω˜1(s
t) = Z1(s)
and T˜ 1(st+1|st) = µ1(s)l1(s)Z1(s)
1+pi1(st+1|st) , we get that:
m˜11(s
t) =
a11(s)Z
1(s)
l1(s)
η − µ1(s)l1(s)Z1(s)
m˜21(s
t) =
a21(s)Z
1(s)
l1(s)
ηε(s)
As intuition suggests, the demand for the domestic currency is negatively related to the
size of the monetary transfer that the agent expects to receive next period from the
domestic central bank. On the other hand, the demand for the foreign currency only
depends on wealth and on the weight attached to the foreign good.
Plugging the last two equations into (3), we can solve for the labour supply of agent 1:
l1(s) =
1
(1 + µ1(s))
1
1+η
The demand for the two currencies of agents born in country 1 is then:
m˜11(s
t) =
Z1(s)
(1 + µ1(s))
1
1+η
(a11(s)− a21(s)µ1(s))
m˜21(s
t) =
a21Z
1(s)
ε(s)
(1 + µ1(s))
η
1+η
where
a11(s)
a21(s)
> µ1(s)27.
Similarly, we can solve for the maximisation problem of agent 2 and obtain his labour
supply:
l2(s) =
1
(1 + µ2(s))
1
1+η
as well as his demand for real money balances:
m˜12(s
t) = a12(s)ε(s)Z
2(s)(1 + µ2(s))
η
1+η
m˜22(s
t) =
Z2(s)
(1 + µ2(s))
1
1+η
(a22(s)− a12(s)µ2(s))
27Notice that the demand for the domestic good is typically no less than the demand for the foreign good:
a11(s)
a21(s)
> 1.
Moreover, we have assumed that µ`(s) < 1. Therefore, the demand for the domestic currency is positive. The same will be
true for agents born in country 2
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Using the budget constraints, we can derive the demand for the two goods of the two
agents:
c11(s
′|s) = a
1
1(s)Z
1(s′)
(1 + µ1(s′))
1
1+η
c21(s
′|s) = a
2
1(s)Z
1(s)Z2(s′)
ε(s)Z2(s)
(1 + µ2(s))
−η
1+η
(1 + µ2(s′))
1
1+η
(1 + µ1(s))
η
1+η
c12(s
′|s) = a
1
2(s)ε(s)Z
2(s)Z1(s′)
Z1(s)
(1 + µ1(s)
−η
1+η )
(1 + µ1(s′))
1
1+η
(1 + µ2(s))
η
1+η
c22(s
′|s) = a
2
2(s)Z
2(s′)
(1 + µ2(s′))
1
1+η
Firstly, notice that the demand for real money balances is independent from history:
m˜`h(s
t) = m˜`h(s). Therefore, the monetary equations reduce to:∑
h
m˜`h(s) = M˜
`(s) ∀ `, s
Given the above, we can find the equilibrium value of ε(s) by plugging the demand
functions for good 1 into the market clearing equation:∑
h
c1h(s
′|s) = y1(s′)
The equilibrium terms of trade are equal to:
ε(s) =
a21(s)
a12(s)
Z1(s)
Z2(s)
(
1 + µ1(s)
1 + µ2(s)
) η
1+η
Using the solution for ε(s), we can find the solution for consumption.
Since y`(s) = M˜ `(s), we have seen that we can easily calculate inflation rates between
any two time periods and for any history of endowments using equation (49). The only
thing left to determine is the initial prices. At the initial node s0, one of the S states are
realized and the real money balances that the initial old hold depend on that initial state.
Denoting initial prices as p`(s0), we then obtain their solutions as follows:
p`(s0) =
M¯ `(1 + µ`(s))
1
1+η
Z`(s)
where M¯ ` is the initial money supplies.
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Proof of Proposition 2
When µ1(s) = µ2(s) = 0, the competitive equilibrium of the economy is (see equations
(1):
lCE1 (s) = 1 l
CE
2 (s) = 1
c1CE1 (s|s′) = aH1 (s′)Z1(s) c2CE1 (s|s′) = aF2 (s′)Z2(s)
c1CE2 (s|s′) = aF1 (s′)Z1(s) c2CE2 (s|s′) = aH2 (s′)Z2(s)
(55)
Suppose that the competitive equilibrium is CPO: lCEh (s) = l
P
h (s) and c
`CE
h (s|s′) =
c`Ph (s|s′) for every h and `. Then, the following conditions on the planner’s weights must
hold:
γP1 (s) =
∑
s′
f(s|s′)γP1 (s′)aH1 (s′) + γP2 (s′)aF2 (s′) (56)
γP2 (s) =
∑
s′
f(s|s′)γP2 (s′)aH2 (s′) + γP1 (s′)aF1 (s′) (57)
γP1 (s
′)aF1 (s
′) = γP2 (s
′)aF2 (s
′) (58)
Condition (58) implies that (56) and (57) can be rewritten as:
γP1 (s) =
∑
s′
f(s|s′)γP1 (s′) (59)
γP2 (s) =
∑
s′
f(s|s′)γP2 (s′) (60)
Using condition (58), let us define A(s) ≡ γP1 (s)
γP2 (s)
=
aF2 (s)
aF1 (s)
. Exploiting this definition, we can
rewrite (59) as follows:
γP2 (s)A(s) =
∑
s′
f(s|s′)γP2 (s′)A(s′) (61)
But then, the latter equation and condition (60) imply that:∑
s′
f(s|s′)γP2 (s′) =
∑
s′ f(s|s′)γP2 (s′)A(s′)
A(s)
or ∑
s′
f(s|s′)γP2 (s′)
(
1− A(s
′)
A(s)
)
= 0
Since f(s|s′) > 0 and γP2 (s) > 0 for every s and s′, for all conditions to hold it must be
that A(s′) = A(s) = A for every s and s′.
On the other hand, suppose that
aF2 (s)
aF1 (s)
= A for every s. Then, the competitive equilib-
rium is Pareto optimal as there exists a vector of weights (58), (59) and (60) that supports
such allocation.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Each central bank chooses the vector of monetary transfers that maximises their welfare
function subject to the equilibrium restrictions, respectively (19) and (20) subject to (21)
and (22). In doing so, each takes the actions of the other central bank as given.
Let us consider the welfare maximization problem of the central bank of country 1.
The first-order conditions are:
µ1(s) :
γN1 (s)
(1 + µ1(s))2
− 1
1 + µ1(s)
∑
s′
f(s|s′)γN1 (s′)aH1 (s′) = 0 ∀ s
Notice that an increase in the monetary transfer in state s increases the leisure of the
young born in that state. However, it has a negative impact on the utility of all agents
when state s is realized when old because output, and hence consumption, falls as a result
of the decision of the agent born in state s to supply less labour. The above equation can
be rearranged as:
µ1N(s) =
γN1 (s)∑
s′ f(s|s′)γN1 (s′)aH1 (s′)
− 1 ∀ s
This is a dominant strategy for the central bank of country 1, as the optimal vector
of transfers does not depend on the actions of the other central bank. We leave the
calculation of the welfare maximisation problem in country 2 to the reader, as it is similar.
If both central banks play their dominant strategy, no central bank has the incentive to
deviate. Therefore, (µ1N(s), µ2N(s)) is a Nash equilibrium of the monetary policy game
between the two central banks.
Proof of Proposition 4
The first-order conditions of the cooperation problem are:
µ1(s) :
γC1 (s)
(1 + µ1(s))2
− 1
1 + µ1(s)
[∑
s′
f(s|s′)[γC1 (s′)aH1 (s′) + γC2 (s′)aF2 (s′)
]
= 0 ∀ s
µ2(s) :
γC1 (s)
(1 + µ2(s))2
− 1
1 + µ2(s)
[∑
s′
f(s|s′)[γC1 (s′)aF1 (s′) + γC2 (s′)aH2 (s)]
]
= 0 ∀ s
Rearranging the first-order conditions, we find that the optimal transfers are (26) and
(27).
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Proof of Proposition 5
In order to appropriately compare the Nash allocations and the CPO allocations, we
assume that the planner chooses the same Nash weights except for attributing arbitrary
weights to the two countries:
γPh (s) = θhγ
N
h (s) where
∑
h
θh = 1
Then:
lP1 (s) =
∑
s′ f(s|s′)(γN1 (s′)aH1 (s′) + θ2θ1γN2 (s′)aF2 (s′))
γN1 (s)
lP2 (s) =
∑
s′ f(s|s′)(γN2 (s′)aH2 (s′) + θ1θ2γN1 (s′)aF1 (s′))
γN2 (s)
Given the optimal monetary transfers (23) (24), the labour supplies in the Nash equilib-
rium are:
lN1 (s) =
∑
s′ f(s|s′)γN1 (s′)aH1 (s′)
γN1 (s)
lN2 (s) =
∑
s′ f(s|s′)γN2 (s′)aH2 (s′)
γN2 (s)
it is easy to see that lPh (s) 6= lNh (s) for 0 < θh <∞. Since this implies that UNh (s) 6= UPh (s)
for every s and h for any possible weights, then the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal.
Proof of Proposition 6
Plug the optimal monetary transfers (26) and (27) into the equilibrium conditions (21)
and (22) to obtain:
lC1 (s) =
∑
s′ f(s|s′)[γC1 (s′)aH1 (s′) + γC2 (s′)aF2 (s′)]
γC1 (s)
c1C1 (s|s′) = aH1 (s′)lC1 (s)Z1(s)
c1C2 (s|s′) = aF1 (s′)lC1 (s)Z1(s)
lC2 (s) =
∑
s′ f(s|s′)[γC2 (s′)aH2 (s′) + γC1 (s′)aF1 (s′)]
γC2 (s)
c2C2 (s|s′) = aH2 (s′)lC2 (s)Z2(s)
c2C1 (s|s′) = aF2 (s′)lC2 (s)Z2(s)
(62)
Suppose that the same weights of the planner are chosen: γC1 (s
′) = γP1 (s
′) and γC2 (s
′) =
γP2 (s
′). Notice that lCh (s) = l
P
h (s) for every h and s. However, c
`C
h (s|s′) = c`Ph (s|s′) for every
h and ` only as long as the weights satisfy the condition that γC1 (s
′)aF1 (s
′) = γC2 (s
′)aF2 (s
′).
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Proof of Proposition 7
When central banks are inactive the nominal exchange rate would take the following
values:
e˜D(1) =
1− aH1 − z1
1− aH2 + z2
e˜D(2) =
1− aH1 + z1
1− aH2 − z2
Therefore, it follows that e˜D(2) > e˜D(1).
Secondly, let us calculate the optimal monetary transfers under non-cooperation and
cooperation. Using equations (23), (24), (26) and (27):
µ1N(1) = 1
aH1 −z1(2p−1)
− 1 µ1CPO(1) = 0
µ1N(2) = 1
aH1 +z1(2p−1)
− 1 µ1CPO(2) = 0
µ2N(1) = 1
aH2 +z2(2p−1)
− 1 µ2CPO(1) =
1−aH1 −z1
1−aH2 +z2
p
1−aH1 −z1
1−aH2 +z2
+(1−p) 1−a
H
1 +z1
1−aH2 −z2
− 1
µ2N(2) = 1
aH2 −z2(2p−1)
− 1 µ2CPO(2) =
1−aH1 +z1
1−aH2 −z2
p
1−aH1 +z1
1−aH2 −z2
+(1−p) 1−a
H
1 −z1
1−aH2 +z2
− 1
(63)
In order to compare the variance under different policy regimes, it is easy to show
(working out the definition of variance) that it is enough to compare the spread between
the two values of the nominal exchange rate across the three regimes and prove that:
e˜N(2)− e˜N(1) > e˜D(2)− e˜D(1) > e˜CPO(2)− e˜CPO(1)
Firstly, let us show that e˜D(2)− e˜D(1) > e˜CPO(2)− e˜CPO(1). Given (7) and (63), the
nominal exchange rate under cooperation behaves as follows:
e˜CPO(1) = p
1− aH1 − z1
1− aH2 + z2
+ (1− p)1− a
H
1 + z1
1− aH2 − z2
e˜CPO(2) = p
1− aH1 + z1
1− aH2 − z2
+ (1− p)1− a
H
1 − z1
1− aH2 + z2
It is easy to see that the exchange rate under cooperation in any state is just a linear
combination of the two realisations of the nominal exchange rate that occur when central
banks are inactive.
Secondly, we prove that e˜N(2) − e˜N(1) > e˜D(2) − e˜D(1). Given (63), the nominal
47
exchange rate takes the following two values in the Nash equilibrium:
e˜N(1) =
1− aH1 − z1
1− aH2 + z2
aH2 − z2(2p− 1)
aH1 + z1(2p− 1)
e˜N(2) =
1− aH1 + z1
1− aH2 − z2
aH2 + z2(2p− 1)
aH1 − z1(2p− 1)
Next, let us introduce the following definitions:
A ≡ 1− a
H
1 + z1
1− aH2 − z2
B ≡ 1− a
H
1 − z1
1− aH2 + z2
C ≡ a
H
2 + z2(2p− 1)
aH1 − z1(2p− 1)
D ≡ a
H
2 − z2(2p− 1)
aH1 + z1(2p− 1)
Since A > B and C > D, it follows that AC − BD > A − B which means that e˜N(2)−
e˜N(1) > e˜D(2)− e˜D(1).
Proof of Proposition 8
The optimal monetary transfers under non-cooperation and cooperation when shocks are
symmetric are:
µ1N(1) = 1
aH1 −z1(2p−1)
− 1 µ1CPO(1) = 0
µ1N(2) = 1
aH1 +z1(2p−1)
− 1 µ1CPO(2) = 0
µ2N(1) = 1
aH2 −z2(2p−1)
− 1 µ2CPO(1) =
1−aH1 −z1
1−aH2 −z2
p
1−aH1 −z1
1−aH2 −z2
+(1−p) 1−a
H
1 +z1
1−aH2 +z2
− 1
µ2N(2) = 1
aH2 +z2(2p−1)
− 1 µ2CPO(2) =
1−aH1 +z1
1−aH2 +z2
p
1−aH1 +z1
1−aH2 +z2
+(1−p) 1−a
H
1 −z1
1−aH2 −z2
− 1
(64)
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Then, the nominal exchange rate takes the following values under the three scenarios:
e˜D(1) =
1− aH1 − z1
1− aH2 − z2
e˜D(2) =
1− aH1 + z1
1− aH2 + z2
e˜N(1) =
1− aH1 − z1
1− aH2 − z2
aH2 + z2(2p− 1)
aH1 + z1(2p− 1)
e˜N(2) =
1− aH1 + z1
1− aH2 + z2
aH2 − z2(2p− 1)
aH1 − z1(2p− 1)
e˜CPO(1) = p
1− aH1 − z1
1− aH2 − z2
+ (1− p)1− a
H
1 + z1
1− aH2 + z2
e˜CPO(2) = p
1− aH1 + z1
1− aH2 + z2
+ (1− p)1− a
H
1 − z1
1− aH2 − z2
Without loss of generality, let us assume that e˜D(2) > e˜D(1). Solving the inequality, this
implies that z1(1− aH2 ) > z2(1− aH1 ).
As above, it is easy to show that e˜D(2) − e˜D(1) > e˜CPO(2) − e˜CPO(1), since the two
central banks would just “smooth the demand shocks away”.
Secondly, we need to prove that e˜N(2) − e˜N(1) > e˜D(2) − e˜D(1). Working out the
inequality, after a few steps we get that:
1− aH1 + z1
1− aH2 + z2
(
aH2 − aH1 + (z1 − z2)(2p− 1)
aH1 − z1(2p− 1)
)
>
1− aH1 − z1
1− aH2 − z2
(
aH2 − aH1 − (z1 − z2)(2p− 1)
aH1 + z1(2p− 1)
)
Next, let us introduce the following definitions:
A ≡ 1− a
H
1 + z1
1− aH2 + z2
B ≡ 1− a
H
1 − z1
1− aH2 − z2
C ≡ a
H
2 − aH1 + (z1 − z2)(2p− 1)
aH1 − z1(2p− 1)
D ≡ a
H
2 − aH1 − (z1 − z2)(2p− 1)
aH1 + z1(2p− 1)
It is easy to show that C > D. Since A > B, it follows that AC − BD > A − B which
means that e˜N(2)− e˜N(1) > e˜D(2)− e˜D(1).
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Proof of Proposition 9
Notice that for zh → 0, the optimal monetary transfers when shocks are asymmetric (63)
and symmetric (64) both converge to:
µ1N(1) = µ1N(2) = 1
aH1
− 1 µ1CPO(1) = µ1CPO(2) = 0
µ2N(1) = µ2N(2) = 1
aH2
− 1 µ2CPO(1) = µ2CPO(2) = 0
(65)
Substituting these into the equilibrium equations (??) and then into the utility functions of
all agents, we obtain the gains of moving from the Nash equilibrium to a CPO allocation:
∆U1limzh→0
≡ UCPO1 limzh→0 − U
N
1 limzh→0
= −1 + aH1 − aH1 log aH1 − (1− aH1 ) log aH2
∆U2limzh→0
≡ UCPO2 limzh→0 − U
N
2 limzh→0
= −1 + aH2 − aH2 log aH2 − (1− aH2 ) log aH1
Firstly, let us show that ∆U1 = ∆U2 > 0 when a
H
2 = a
H
1 = a
H . When countries are
identical, the above equations can be rewritten as:
∆U1 = ∆U2 = −1 + aH − log aH
In this case, it is easy to verify that ∆U is monotonically decreasing in aH :d∆U
daH
= 1 −
1
aH
< 0. As aH tends to zero, we have that limaH→0 ∆U = +∞. On the other hand,
limaH→1 ∆U = 0. Since 0 ≤ aH ≤ 1, the gains from cooperation are always positive for
both agents.
The next step is to prove that there is an open set around aH1 = a
H
2 = a
H where both
countries would gain from cooperation. To start with, observe that ∆U1 and ∆U2 are
functions of two parameters: aH1 and a
H
2 . Our approach is to study each of them as a
function of aH2 , while showing that the properties of each function are invariant with a
H
1 .
Let us start with ∆U1. Firstly, let us calculate the derivative of ∆U1 with respect
to aH2 :
∂∆U1
∂aH2
= −1−aH1
aH2
< 0. Secondly, notice that ∆U1aH2 =0 = +∞ while ∆U1aH2 =1 =
−1 + aH1 − aH1 log aH1 . Let us then calculate the sign of ∆U1aH2 =1. When aH1 = 0, then
∆U1aH2 =1,aH1 =0 = −1. On the other hand, ∆U1aH2 =1,aH1 =1 = 0. It is easy to check that
∆U1aH2 =1 is increasing in a
H
1 . Hence, we can say that ∆U1aH2 =1 < 0 for a
H
1 ≤ 1. Hence,
the gains for country 1 are positive but decreasing as aH2 increases and become negative
for some value of aH2 .
We now study ∆U2 as a function of a
H
2 . Let us calculate the derivative of ∆U2 with
respect to aH2 :
∂∆U2
∂aH2
= − log aH2 + log aH1 . The derivative is zero when aH1 = aH2 . It can
be verified that this point is a maximum since the second derivative is negative. When
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aH1 = a
H
2 , we already know that ∆U2 > 0. Hence, there is an open set around a
H
1 = a
H
2
such that ∆U2 > 0.
The properties of both functions hold for any aH1 . Therefore, we have proved that all
agents would gain from cooperation for an open set around aH1 = a
H
2 .
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